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Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000200020007-2

U-2R #053  
ACCIDENT  
17 APRIL 1969

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**DISPATCH**

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

S E C R E T

TO

Director, OSA

MARKED FOR INDEXING

INFO.

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

FROM

Commander, [REDACTED]

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK  
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

SUBJECT

General: Accident Report Involving U-2R #053.

MICROFILM

Specific: Facts, Conclusions and Recommendations, re the Accident.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PROBLEM:

The protection of detachment assets while on deployment.

FACTS:

was not available and subsequent checks with the Navy verified a suspicion that coordination for delivery of the vehicle had not filtered down to the working level. A member of the team had to search out the whereabouts of the forklift and delivered it to our working area (after having

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

13 June 1969

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

S E C R E T

UCLT-1553

coordinated the problem with the Navy).

3. The forklift was used constantly until approximately 2100 hours, at which time it was parked on the apron contiguous to the hangar used to house the U-2R. (Note Tab "A".) Work continued in the hangar and on the apron when at approximately 2130 hours it was decided to move the U-2R out of the hangar onto the apron to allow more working room in the hangar for positioning equipment.

4. [ ] appeared on the scene at 2135 hours. He approached the aircraft toward the nose where he asked [ ] if he could take the forklift back to the Navy compound. (NOTE: Tab "A") Mr. [ ] replied that he could see no reason for us keeping the forklift any longer and with that remark, [ ] proceeded counter-clockwise around the aircraft toward the forklift (see Tab "A" for flow patterns and equipment placement at time of the accident). Meanwhile, security officer, [ ] who was at the tail of the aircraft, saw [ ] when he approached the aircraft. [ ] started clockwise to intercept him on his course, so he doubled back to meet him coming from the opposite direction. [ ] reached the forklift, started the engine and at this instance [ ] passed in a landrover vehicle he was using to position equipment around the aircraft. [ ] left the parking area and began to follow [ ] around the tail of the aircraft. [ ] continued in a straight line after passing the tail and exited the apron at the corner of the hangar. [ ] who could not explain why, turned forty-five degrees to the left after passing the tail, instead of following [ ] as he had been, and began a collision course. At this moment, three Lockheed employees and the security guard began yelling for [ ] to stop. [ ] did not hear them through engine noise emitted by the forklift and his preoccupation with the U-2R. [ ] continued in this course until he impacted the right wing of the U-2R.

5. Within five minutes after the accident, [ ] was being interviewed by the senior security officer. [ ], the senior security officer reported, was visibly quite upset and kept repeating, "I've done it now and anything they do to me, I deserve it." The initial interview with [ ] produced nothing further than that he could not explain the accident and that he did not see the aircraft. Tabs "B" through "J" are photos of the damaged wing.

6. [ ] the Navy files made available, offered a [ ] holds a Top Secret clearance based on a background completed by the 14th Naval District. He has attended several Navy trade schools, finishing near the top of the class. The Navy has commended him for outstanding educational achievement. His general aptitude tests show him as being above-average. According to [ ]

[ ] drivers license one year ago and according to [ ], has driven a forklift only on three occasions in that time. [ ] unofficial driving record indicates that he was involved in two accidents, one in which he was driving a bus that was rammed from behind by an Englishman on a motorcycle. The other resulted in a loss of control of his personal automobile on a rain-slick road returning from a night on the town.

7. Normal controls around the aircraft were less stringent to conform with the cover story which in this instance was USAF. Overt security controls were minimized to preclude an appearance of other than a non-classified US Air Force project.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. [ ] was not qualified to drive a forklift in an area crowded with sensitive equipment and personnel.

2. The Navy was remiss in not coordinating within its own ranks the support they were to provide. The fact that [ ] took it upon himself to return the forklift was not a part of the support agreement as understood by this detachment.

FORM  
8-64  
(40)

53a

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

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CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

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<b>CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION  S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 50px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></div> 553 25X1A
<p>3. The de-emphasis on the overt security aspects of the deployment had a deliberate tendency for everyone to be less attentive to the physical protection of the aircraft.</p> <p><u>RECOMMENDATIONS:</u></p> <p>1. That, providing it is consistent with the cover story, plausible security, the U-2 be protected on future deployments by a rope guard on stanchions with one access point controlled by a security representative, and that strobe lights be placed around the aircraft during the hours of darkness.</p> <p>2. Insofar as practical and plausible, that movement of equipment around the aircraft be performed only by members of the deployed team.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 50px; margin: 10px auto;"></div> <p style="text-align: right;">25X1A</p> <p>Atch:</p> <p>A. Photograph of damaged wing.</p> <p>B. Sketch and layout at the time of the accident.</p>		
FORM 8-64 (40) <b>53a</b> USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION  S E C R E T	<div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 30px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></div> CONTINUED <div style="float: right;">PAGE NO.  3</div>


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

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

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
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
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


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